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BANKS AND THE EQUAL PAY ACT:
ESTABLISHING A BONA FIDE
MANAGEMENT TRAINEE PROGRAM
Merle F. Wilberding*
I.

INTRODUCTION

There is probably no subject more sensitive to an employer
today than "discrimination." The mood of the country and the
"persuasive encouragement" of legislation and governmental enforcement, are making employers acutely aware of their obligation
to eradicate any type of discrimination in the hiring, paying, promotion and termination of any of their employees. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in its enforcement of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act,,
acts as the vanguard on many of the attacks on discrimination due
to race, creed, religion, or national origin.' However, there is another
form of discrimination which is equally as pervasive, devastating,
deep-rooted, and antithetic as any of the other forms: sex discrimination.
II.

SEX DISCRIMINATION

The basis of the Equal Rights Amendment 3 is to provide equal
rights with corresponding equal obligations to men and women.'
Associate, Coolidge, Wall, Matusoff, Womsley & Lombard, Dayton, Ohio. B.A., St.
Mary's College (Minn.), 1966; M.B.A., University of Dayton, 1975; J.D., University of Notre
Dame, 1969; LL.M., George Washington University, 1972. Member, bars of Ohio, District of
Columbia and Iowa.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1964). This encompasses Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and its amendments from the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.
2. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Strain v. Philpott, 331 F.
Supp. 836 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Guzman v. Polich & Benedict Constr. Co., 62 CCH LAB. L. REe.
9385 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd
per curiam, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); cf. Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698 (1971).
3. See generally, Freund, "The Equal Rights Amendment is Not the Way", 6 HARV. CIV.
RIGHTS-Civ. LIB. L. REV. 234 (1971); Murphy, Sex Discriminationin Employment - Can We
Legislate a Solution?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 437 (1971); Comment, Discrimination& Equal Protection:
Do We Need a ConstitutionalAmendment?, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1499 (1971).
4. Murphy, Sex Discriminationin Employment - Can We Legislate a Solution?, 17
N.Y.L.F. 437 (1971).
While the effects of the amendment have not been completely tabulated, essentially,
it should at least do the following: 1) equalize property rights of men and women; 2)
*
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Few people are aware that an "Equal Rights Amendment has been
introduced in every Congress since 1923. ''5
The intensity of the campaign for equal rights for both sexes,
particularly for those rights relating to employment, is probably in
direct proportion to the number of females in the total labor force
of the United States.' World War II, and its high demand for men
in the military, contributed to the number of women in the civilian
labor force at that time. Since that period, however, the growth has
been primarily due to a fundamental change in the attitude of married women and their expectations toward men, work, and life.7
Unfortunately, this change in attitude among women did not result
in a corresponding change among employers.' The traditional practice of sexual segregation remained entrenched.' While it was natural to assume that some differential in compensation was due to
different job selection, the fact remained that similar discrepancies
appeared in those occupations which included both men and
women. 0 These considerations prompted a legislative solution to
the problem.
require women to serve on juries and in the military; 3) remove labor protective laws
which restrict hours, weight-lifting limits, and other conditions of female employment;
4) alter the presumptions and benefits accorded to women in family and divorce cases;
5) eliminate all-male and all-female institutions such as schools, colleges and military
academies; 6) equalize benefits and obligations under the Social Security Law
and
various state laws; 7) remove sex as a qualification for any employment position;
and
8) remove any prohibition regarding marriage between persons of the same sex. Id.
at
438, n.6.
5. Murray & Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discriminationand Title
VII, 34
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232, 236 (1965). Yet, the proposed Constitutional amendment
has not
yet been ratified by the requisite number of states.
6. Since the turn of the century, the percentage of women in the total labor force
has
risen from approximately 18% to approximately 40% by the current year. Economic
Report
of the President, 91, Table 21 (1973).
7. Waldmen, Changes in the Labor Force Activity of Women, 93 MONTHLY LAB.
REV.
10, 11 (1970).
8. Ross & McDermott, The Equal Pay Act of 196f3: A Decade of Enforcement, 16
B.C.
IND. & CoM. L. REV. 1 (1974).
9. Though sex-based stratification of economic roles may to some extent reflect
the socially conditioned desires of men and women themselves, there can be
little
doubt that there has been considerable employer resistance to the job applicant
seeking employment in a position that tradition, collective bargaining agreement, or
law
had marked out as the exclusive preserve of the opposite sex.
Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discriminationin American Law III: Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights
Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 305, 307 (1968).
10. For example, female school teachers consistently received only 75% of their
male
counterparts' earnings. See Ross & McDermott, supra note 10, at 3. Further, Department
of
Labor surveys suggested that male tellers in banks were paid from $5.50 to $31 per
week more
than females occupying similar positions. Id., citing Hearings on H.R. 8898 and H.R.
10226,
Define the Select Subcomm. on Education & Labor, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 66-67
(1962).
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III. THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963
Although efforts to secure federal equal pay had been brewing
in Congress since 1945," it was not until June 10, 1963 that President Kennedy signed into law the Equal Pay Act of 196312 as an
amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended.'3
The purpose of the Equal Pay Act was to put some force behind the
proposition that two persons, regardless of sex, performing equal
work should receive equal pay." Thus, to invoke the Equal Pay Act,
the two affected workers of the opposite sex must be performing
work which requires equal skills, effort, responsibility, and performance under similar working conditions. In carrying out its obligation
to administer and enforce the Equal Pay Act, the Department of
Labor has promulgated certain administrative regulations 5 which
11. See generally, Ross & McDermott, supra note 10, at 4-5.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1964). In signing the bill into law, President Kennedy made the
following observations concerning the need for such legislation:
[Tihe average woman worker earns only 60 percent of the average wage for men ....
Our economy today depends upon women in the labor force. One out of three workers
is a woman. Today, there are almost 25 million women employed, and their number
is rising faster than the number of men in the labor force. It is extremely important
that adequate provision be made for reasonable levels of income to them, for the care
of children . . . and for the protection of the family unit . . . . The lower the family
income, the higher the probability that the mother must work. Today one out of five
of these working mothers has children under three. Two out of five have children of
school age. Among the remainder, about 50 percent have husbands who earn less than
$5,000 a year - many of them much less. I believe they bear the heaviest burden of
any group in our nation. Where the mother is the sole support of the family, she often
must face the hard choice of either accepting public assistance or taking a position at
a pay rate which averages less than two-thirds of the pay rate for men.
21 CONG. Q. 978 (1963), cited in Ross & McDermott, supra note 10, at 5-6.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 201-19 (1964). Specifically, it provided at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1964):
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a
rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such
establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skills,
effort, and responsibility and which are performed under similar working conditions,
except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit
system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of productions;
or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex: Provided, That an
employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not,
in order to comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any
employee.
14. See generally, Murphy, Female Wage Discrimination:A Study of the Equal Pay
Act 1963-1970, 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 615 (1970).
15. 29 C.F.R. § 800 et seq. (1973). 29 C.F.R. § 800.2 states in relevant part:
The interpretations of law contained in this part are official interpretations of the
Department of Labor with respect to the application under described circumstances
of the provisions of law which they discuss . . . . They indicate the construction of
law which the Secretary of Labor and the [Department of Labor] believe to be correct
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interpret the above criteria.'" Employers learned early that it was
not easy to discriminate in pay based on those factors. Litigation
soon made it clear that equal did not mean identical;'7 it was sufficient if the job only required substantially the same degree of skill,
experience, and responsibility.'" Accordingly, incidental and occasional performance of differing job requirements did not exempt the
situation from the Equal Pay Act and did not justify a pay differential.'9
The Equal Pay Act can be enforced by three methods:
(1) criminal indictments; (2) government civil litigation; and (3)
private civil litigation. Under its enforcement provisions, criminal
proceedings can be instituted for wilful violations of the Equal Pay
Act.2 0
In the typical case, the Department of Labor attempts a conciliation of the problem which normally includes an award of back pay.
If its attempts to conciliate are unsuccessful, the Department of
Labor administrator is authorized to bring an action in federal district court seeking a mandatory injunction for the payment of equal
wages and back wages for the aggrieved employees.'
If the Department of Labor does not institute suit and notifies
the aggrieved employees that they have the right to sue the employer, then any aggrieved employee may file a private suit for
recovery of (1) unpaid back wages, (2) an amount equal to the
unpaid back wages as a civil penalty or as liquidated damages,
including (3) reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs.2
In the civil litigation, there is an additional provision which
plays an important role in determining how the employer reacts to
an "Equal Pay" charge. That provision prohibits an employer who
is paying a wage differential in violation of the Equal Pay Act from
and which will guide them in the performance of their duties under the Act unless and
until they are otherwise directed by authoritative decisions of the courts or conclude,
upon reexamination of an interpretation, that it is incorrect.
16. Under these regulations, skill means "experience, training, education, and ability"
pertaining to the particular job. 29 C.F.R. § 800.125 (1973). Effort means "the measurement
of the physical or mental exertion needed for the performance of a job." 29 C.F.R. § 800.127
(1973). Responsibility means the amount of "accountability required in the performance of
the job, with emphasis on the importance of the job obligation." 29 C.F.R. § 800.129 (1973).
17. Wirtz v. Rainbo Baking Co., 303 F. Supp. 1049, 1052 (E.D. Ky. 1967).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (1964). For the first offense, the penalty is a fine not to exceed
$10,000; for the second and succeeding convictions, a similar fine and/or up to six months'
imprisonment may be imposed.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1964).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1964).
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reducing the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with the
law. 3 Obviously, compliance may be very expensive for an employer
who is faced with a substantial back pay award and a prospective
requirement for an indefinite time of a substantially increased payroll. This factor alone will often compel an employer to seek complete vindication even though in other instances he might have
been willing to negotiate a settlement.Y However, until tempered by
judicial fiat or legislative modification, the "all or nothing" prescription seems to necessitate an unyielding defense.

IV.

APPLICATION OF THE EQUAL PAY

ACT

TO BANKS

The banking industry has been significantly affected by the
Equal Pay Act.25 The-particularly troublesome job classification in
the bank is that of teller.26 Any time a bank has paid a male teller
more than a female teller, it becomes vulnerable to investigation, if
not litigation, for an alleged violation of the Equal Pay Act. Some
litigation involving banks has centered on whether the pay differen27
tial can be justified on additional responsibility, skills, or efforts.
One exception to the application of the Equal Pay Act's provisions has been for a "factor other than sex" which has been interpreted to include a bona fide training program. The administrative
interpretative regulations provide that employees engaged in bona
fide training programs may rotate among various jobs even though
he/she may be receiving a wage differential from other employees
in each of the various jobs.28 Despite the simple parameters for
23. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1964). Although a similar provision exists in equal pay acts
in ten states, there are an additional thirty-five states in which there is no such prohibition.
See generally, Landan & Dunahoo, Sex Discriminationin Employment: A Survey of State
and FederalRemedies, 20 DRAKE L. Rav. 417 (1971).
24. This factor appears in practice to be a sensitive area in the Equal Pay Act. The Act
provides no flexibility for settlement as to back pay or to future pay. For a more complete
discussion, see text accompanying notes 84-94, infra.
25. As of mid-1971, banking institutions employed 645,000 women-63% of all bank
employees. Moran, Equal Pay for Women, 63 BANKING 28 (June 1971).
26. "Banks employ approximately 200,000 tellers. About seven out of ten are women."
Id. at 29.
27. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 800.148 (1970); Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041
(5th Cir. 1973); Shultz v. First Victoria Nat'l Bank, 420 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1969); Hodgson v.
Security Nat'l Bank, 460 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1972).
28. Interpretative Regulation § 800.148 provides in relevant part as follows:
Employees employed under a bona fide training program may, in the furtherance of
their training, be assigned from time to time to various types of work in the establishment. At such times, the employee in a training status may be performing equal work
with non-trainees of the opposite sex whose wages or wage rates may be unequal to
those of the trainee. Under the circumstances, provided the rate paid to the employee
in training status is paid, regardless of sex, under the training program, the differential
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judging the validity of the training program, specific factual situations have generated many other factors which the courts have used
to evaluate whether a particular bank's proffered "training program" does so qualify.
The application and scope of the Equal Pay Act was subjected
to much litigation in order to have a judicial determination of the
parameters of the Act's coverage." In Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co. ,"'
Wheaton, over an extended period, had employed only male
"selectors-packers," i.e., individuals who select out defective
bottles
and pack acceptable bottles into packing cartons. Subsequently, the
position of "female selector-packer" was created; this employee received less than her male counterpart, but she was not permitted
to lift certain cartons in excess of 35 pounds.2 In addition, the
company claimed that the male employees performed several additional tasks.3 In reviewing the situation in light of the Equal Pay
Act, the Third Circuit examined legislative intent and concluded
that the Act in prescribing equal pay for equal work did not require
identical work, but only "that they must be substantially equal. '34
This rule obviously blocked avoidance of the Act's application by
the creation of artificial job classifications. It also paved the way for
an effective enforcement of the administrative interpretations and
clearly put the burden on the employer to establish that any disparity was due to substantially different jobs, not merely technically
different jobs.
More than ten years after the enactment of the Equal Pay Act,
the Supreme Court affirmed in Corning Glass Works v. Brennan"
can be shown to be attributable to a factor other than sex and no violation of the equal
pay standard will result. Training programs which appear to be available only to
employees of one sex will, however, be carefully examined to determine whether such
programs are, in fact, bona fide. In an establishment where a differential is paid to
employees of one sex because, traditionally, only they have been considered eligible
for promotion to executive positions, such a practice, in the absence of a bona fide
training program, would be a discrimination based on sex and result in a violation of
the equal pay provisions, if the equal pay standard otherwise applies.
29. See, e.g., Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
905 (1970); Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1973); Hodgson v. Security
Nat'l Bank, 460 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1972); Brennan v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896
(5th Cir. 1974); Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970); Shultz v.
American Can Co.-Dixie Prod., 424 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1970); Hodgson v. Miller Brewing Co.,
457 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1972); Hodgson v. Square D Co., 459 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1972).
30. 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
31. 421 F.2d at 262.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 262-63.
34. Id. at 265.
35. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
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the goal of the Act by providing that "equal work will be rewarded
by equal wages. '36 It also recognized that putting substance into the
phrase "performed under similar working conditions" required an
acknowledgement that the government should not be secondguessing the employer's job evaluation system; but neither should
the government permit a thinly-veneered "job evaluation" to be
used to avoid the effect of the Equal Pay Act. 37 A fortiori, bona fide
classifications and programs were permissible exceptions to the act,
but if the government attacked their validity, the burden was on the
employer to justify them. 38 It was that concept, applied to the recognized exception of bona fide training programs which created the
litigation for many banks, investigations for still more banks, and
raised questions that all banks should consider.
The first litigation involving bank management trainee programs and the Equal Pay Act was Shultz v. First Victoria National
Bank.3 9 This action involved that bank and the American Commerce Bank. The issue was: Were women bookkeepers and tellers
receiving substantially less in wages than male employees for performing the same work?4"
The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that a bona
fide training program existed. On appeal, the bank's primary defense was its "management training" program. The circuit court
rejected this defense in its entirety:
The training programs. . were informal, unwritten, and, if not
imaginary, consisted of little more than the recognition of the ability
of employees to work their way up the ranks . . . .The rotation of
the 'trainee' has apparently been, unpredictable, sporadic and unplanned. The time spent in each department varied widely and was
in fact based not upon any concept of training but upon the bank's
personnel needs. 4
Indeed, when male employees were hired, the vice-president in
charge of personnel did not know if that employee would be
"trained" as an officer; yet, male employees were hired at substantially higher pay rates than were their female counterparts.2 It was
clear that there were no objective definitions of the so-called train36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 195.
Id. at 200-04.

Id.
420 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 650-51.
Id. at 654-55.
Id. at 655.
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ing programs.4 3
The court was wary that any statutory exception, unless narrowly construed, would dissipate the intent, if not the clear statutory language of the Act by permitting "the exception to swallow the
rule."" Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded, holding that
no bona fide management training program existed, and that the
differential in pay was not due to a factor other than sex.4"
On remand, the district court in First Victoria Bank found that
some male employees were paid more for performing as commercial
tellers than were certain female employees;"6 however, the Government's arguments that this disparity constituted a violation of the
Act were again rejected. The court found that certain disparities
were due to unequal work assignments. 7 The court also found that
the bank had a bona fide merit promotion system which was nondiscriminatory.48 It is significant that in approving the merit promotion
system, the court took into account the fact that female employees
had additional personal demands which affected their promotion
within the bank." On remand a substantial number of the Government's arguments and victories in the prior court of appeals case
were unquestionably weakened. The Government appealed, but the
Fifth Circuit affirmed. °
The issues involving the American Bank of Commerce were
resolved in a separate remand." The trial court again reviewed all
43. [The training program . . . were not specified and their metes and bounds
were at best poorly surveyed. As structured and operated it was little more than a postevent justification for disparate pay to men and women from the commencement of
employment throughout advancement. The training was essentially the acquiring of
skills and experience and knowledge of the business through continued performance
of regular tasks. In this sense every job in every type of business would be training,
and nothing would be left for the operation of the Interpretative Bulletin Training
Program. Id. at 655-56.
44. Id. at 657; see also Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th
Cir. 1969).
45. Id. at 659.
46. Wirtz v. First Victoria Nat'l Bank, 63 CCH LAB. L. REP. 32,378 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
48. The evidence is undisputed that the officers and directors of the bank held
quarterly meetings for the purpose of evaluating the service of the various employees;
the officers in charge of the various departments expressed their views as to the competence, the interest and the value to the bank of the employees in question. Id.
49. It is undisputed that many of the female tellers were married women, with
small children. Their personal and domestic demands were such that they did little
more than put in the allotted number of hours at the bank..The two male employees
in question, as well as certain of the female employees, showed more aptitude, more
interest, and more diligence. They were promoted from time to time and ultimately
were made officers. Id.
50. Hodgson v. First Victoria Nat'l Bank, 446 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1971).
51. Wirtz v. American Bank of Commerce, 64 CCH LAB. L. REP.
32,400 (S.D. Tex.
1970).
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the employees, their duties and their pay scales. The court found
that the male employee was typically paid more than some female
employees, but less than others.5" The court concluded that any
disparity in pay was not due to sex discrimination.5 3 The Government appealed and the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed
in part.54 The findings which were reversed were those in which the
district court had found (1) some pay disparity, but allegedly not a
sufficient disparity to constitute a violation and (2) that the Government's statistical evidence was insufficient to establish sex-based
discrimination. 5 The court concluded that any disparity, no matter
how small, constitutes a violation and the Government is entitled
to its remedy.5" Additionally, it is not the Government's burden to
justify its statistics; it need only establish a disparity; the employer
must then justify the difference in pay structure.5 7
As to male employee "Smith," the bank had attempted to justify the wage differentials because the employee performed "additional duties," specifically supervisory duties.58 The district court
found the evidence to be minimal since these duties were infrequent
and insignificant in time59 and, therefore, found a violation of the
Act. 0
Following American Bank of Commerce and First Victoria National Bank, the next bank management trainee case appeared in
Hodgson v. Security NationalBank,"' in which female employees in
the paying-and-receiving teller cages received less than male socalled "management trainees. 62 The bank went so far as to stipu52. Id. at 44,459.
53. Id. at 44,460.
54. Hodgson v. American Bank of Commerce, 447 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1971).
55. 447 F.2d at 419-20.
56. Id. at 420. "Any differential in the wages paid to the respective sexes is prohibited
by the Act unless adequately justified under one of its statutory exceptions." Id. See also,
e.g., Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970)
($0.215/hr. differential); Wirtz v. Basic Indus., 256 F. Supp. 786 (D. Nev. 1966)($0.15/hr.
differential).
57. 447 F.2d at 420; see also, e.g., Shultz v. American Can Co.-Dixie Prod., 424 F.2d
356 (8th Cir. 1970); Krumbeck v. John Oster Mfg. Co., 313 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Wis. 1970);
Wirtz v. Muskogee Jones Stone Co., 293 F. Supp. 1034 (E.D. Okla. 1968).
58. 447 F.2d at 422.
59. Smith supervised the cashing of checks, helping other tellers balance out, and was
a general "trouble shooter." Id.
60. Id. at 423. The only portion of the opinion which was affirmed was that portion
relating to one male teller who was performing both bookkeeping duties and teller duties to
such an extent that the court concluded he was performing sufficient additional work to
justify a wage differential.
61. 460 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1972).
62. Id. at 58.
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late that the work performed was equal with respect to skill, effort,
responsibility, and working conditions.13 The facts reveal that a
male with one year of college and no banking experience was hired
at a higher rate than one female college graduate with some banking
experience. 4 The bank based its argument on the theory that the
male employees were management trainees and thus the differential
was due to a factor other than sex."
The difficulty with the bank's position was its lack of objective
support and questionable evidence for its gossamer management
trainee program. For example, it contended that only men entered
the management training program because women characteristically had been uninterested in the management positions. 6 Further, the program had little formal structure. There was testimony
that qualified applicants for the management trainee position
would train as paying-and-receiving tellers by rotation for a period
of eighteen to twenty-four months after which time they "might" be
transferred into a management position. 7 The bank's case was perhaps further weakened. by its tacit admission of a violation when it
was revealed that eight months after the Department of Labor
started its investigation the bank prepared a formal written description of its management trainee program. The Eighth Circuit ruled
against the bank on almost all issues. Specifically, the court noted
the following as significant:
1. The training program was not open to both sexes.66
2. Rotation among tellers was geared 69 to the needs of the bank, not
to the training requirements.
3. In most instances, male employees were unaware that any training program existed. Indeed, a male applicant was only assured that,
as a hope for the future, advancement would occur "if everything
7
worked out.
4. Female applicants were better qualified than male, but were not
admitted to the program. For example, the male "trainees" included
a former "fry cook" and a high school graduate who farmed. 7
5. There was no evidence that the program had ever been offered
7
to any females. 1
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id. at 58 n. 1.
Id. at 58-59.
Id. at 60.

67. Id.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 60-61.
at 61.
at 61, n. 7.
at 61-62.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol1/iss1/4

19761

BANKS AND EQUAL PAY ACT

Perhaps the determinative factor in the Eighth Circuit's reversal of the trial court's finding of no violation was the conclusion that
the bank's operations were based on preconceived stereotyped concepts of the role of men and women in business. 3
Based on the above factors, the Eighth Circuit rejected the
proffered management trainee program as a post-mortem attempt
to justify an otherwise improper wage differential.
The so-called "management trainee" defense was next tendered in Hodgson v. IndustrialBank of Savannah74 in which the bank
involved was a small financial institution employing fourteen employees, including three executives. 5
The court noted the following facts:
1. No woman employee ever participated in the "management
training program.''7
77
2. There was no formal written description of the program .
3. There was testimony that the bank's past practice was justified
because males are more likely to become permanent employees
as
7
they do not have to leave to go to school or become pregnant. 1
The court concluded that there was a wage differential between
employees of the opposite sex, there was no bona fide training program, and there was a violation because the discrimination was due
79
to sex.
The significance of the IndustrialBank of Savannah case is the
court's view of the proper remedy for a violation of the Equal Pay
Act. It is recalled that the male employee had only worked at the
bank for three and one-half months. Yet the statute appears to be
clear that the discriminated employees' wages must be raised to at
73. The bank's explanation for the absence of women in the ranks of its management trainees recites a preconceived and traditional notion that women, because of
their principal roles as wives and mothers, must occupy an employment status second
to men outside the home. This notion is outmoded as well as unfair. Id. at 63.
74. 347 F. Supp. 63 (S.D. Ga. 1972).
75. Id. at 65. The management trainee was a 25-year-old male with a high school
diploma. He had taken a few college courses while he was in the military. His experience
consisted of being a newspaper apprentice, a sales trainee for a business concern, and a clerk
at the George Ports Authority. The bank's records indicated he was hired as a "management
trainee" at a beginning salary of $400.00 per month. He worked initially with a female
bookkeeper whose salary rate was $280.00 per month. Thereafter, he trained as a teller among
a pool of female employees whose salaries ranged from $280.00 to $295.00 per month. Three
and one-half months after he was hired, his employment was terminated because he was
"unable to learn work." It was noted that he had taken none of the courses in bank operations
sponsored by the American Institute of Banking.
76. 347 F. Supp. at 67.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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least equal the male's and that the employer cannot lower anyone's
wages to become in compliance with the law. Thus, the small bank
was left with no management trainee, and it would have to raise all
of the bookkeepers and tellers to a salary rate of at least $400.00 per
month not only for the period in which the trainee had worked at
the bank but ad infinitum in the future. Despite the apparent unambiguous language of the statute, the specific circumstances involved in that case apparently caused the judge to question whether
that rule ought apply to that fact situation:
It is nonetheless difficult to conceive that Congress could have
intended so harsh and inequitable result from an isolated, non-wilful
and non-intentional violation. It strikes me as a rather drastic and
mechanical consequence of a violation such as this to warrant the
imposition of a wage basis of $400.00 per month for all female tellers
and bookkeepers from the time [the "trainee"] was employed and
thenceforth.10
The judge was particularly concerned because the employer's
termination of the "trainee" had absolutely nothing to do with the
equal pay investigation. "[H]ere the termination of employment
did not represent any effort on the Bank's part to bring itself into
compliance or avoid the consequences of the violation of the Act."'"
The judge called for further briefs on that issue and the subsequent
addendum to the opinion makes it clear that the Government and
the bank entered into a settlement for something less than that
which would have been computed under a mechanical computation
of damages.
The full significance of this case has not yet been judicially
determined. No appeal was filed and no similar cases have been
decided. This case is a further illustration of the cliche: bad facts
make bad law. Clearly, the facts did not justify the mechanical
statutory remedy. Nor did the statute's application permit any exceptions. A judge sympathetic to the plight of the employer simply
"suggested" that a negotiated settlement be agreed upon. This is no
doubt a case which will have little independent precedent and can
be objectively relied upon. Courts wishing to be sympathetic to a
particular set of facts will cite IndustrialBank of Savannah as authority for modifying the requested relief. Courts which are prepared to impose the full statutory remedy will easily distinguish the
case on the basis of "clear statutory" language. Neither banks nor
80.
81.

Id. at 68-69.
Id. at 69.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol1/iss1/4

BANKS AND EQUAL PAY ACT

t9761

lawyers should rely on the case as a means of predicting future
conduct or the future course of particular litigation.
VI.

THE FUTURE OF MANAGEMENT TRAINEE PROGRAMS FOR BANKS

The covey of cases of banks and their management training
programs has left a number of hints for banks and lawyers in charting the future direction for their plans. However, these cases are not
able to provide insulation in certain situations. Not even the Department of Labor's administrative interpretations provide'a "safe
harbor" except in a general sense in that they specify a bona fide
program must be open to both sexes. Particular banks appreciate
that as a goal but need specific concrete guidelines which minimize
the risk of being found in violation of the Act. Each bank situation
requires an analysis of its structure, size, facilities, and goals in
order to suggest a program which has been tailored for that bank
and which still will meet the judicial tests recently promulgated.
If a bank decides to establish a management training program,
it must be certain that it does so in such a manner that it stays
within the penumbra of the factors mentioned in the adjudicated
cases and the administrative interpretations. This will permit it to
construct a bona fide program which is an exception to the application of the Equal Pay Act. In building such a program, the following
factors should be considered and incorporated into the bank's program:
1. The management training program should be formalized by reducing it to writing.2 In some instances it might be appropriate
to use the services of a management consulting firm in order to
explicate the job descriptions. Specifically, the program should
include the following:
a. It should require specific additional training and supervision.
For many banks this will include the certificate programs sponsored by the American Institute of Banking.83 For the larger
banks, in-house instruction programs are sometimes established.
b. It should prescribe a definite rotational schedule which
should be adhered to for the benefit of the training program, not
for the benefit of the bank's needs.8 4
82.
83.
1971). It
training,
Hodgson
84.

Id.
See note 88, supra. See also Moran, Equal Pay for Women, 63 BANKING 28, 30 (June
is also clear that the smallness of the employer, i.e., one who cannot afford formal
does not excuse it from its duty to establish a bona fide training program. See
v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041, 1048 (5th Cir. 1973).
See, e.g., Hodgson v. Security Nat'l Bank, 460 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1972).
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c. It should be as specific as possible.15
d. It should have built-in record-keeping requirements and procedures.
e. It should have a specific identifiable point of termination."
2. All employees should be advised of its existence and its terms and
conditions. 7
3. The program, its announcements and its actual application
should make it clear that it is in fact available to men and
women.
4. Applicants interviewed for the management training program
should be so advised, so hired, and so employed.89
5. Additional work should be built into the program so that even if
a management trainee is, e.g., performing the skills of a teller,
he/she is also required to have significant additional responsibilities .0

6.

Upon completion of the training program, the trainee should be
placed immediately into a management position and not be required to "wait for an opening. ' '9'
7. If otherwise qualified, women should be admitted to the program
in order to establish a record of past performance. 2
The cases make clear that the courts are going to be very cautious when considering "management training programs." Further,
it is apparent that bona fide means more than innocent and unconscious mistakes. "A bona fide training program, to constitute a valid
exception to the Equal Pay Act, must represent more than an honest
effort; such a program must have substance and significance independent of the trainee's regular job."" The importance of creating
a valid program is easily appreciated when the economics of the
remedy is computed for a violation. Raising the wages of all tellers
or bookkeepers "in the pool" up to the level of the wage rate of the
sham trainee is extremely onerous, regardless of bank size. Further,
the remedy is one which will always apply since a violation not only
justifies back wages but also the payment of all future wages computed according to the same standard. For these reasons, banks and
their counsel are well advised to carefully review their policies for
85. 2 CCH LAB. L. REP. 30,112.
86. Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041, 1045 (5th Cir. 1973).
87. See Hodgson v. Security Nat'l Bank, 460 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1972).
88. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1964); 2 CCH LAB. L. REP. 30,112.
89. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Security Nat'l Bank, 460 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1972).
90. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Industrial Bank, 347 F. Supp. 63 (S.D. Ga. 1972); Shultz v.
First Victoria Nat'l Bank, 420 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1969); Brennan v. Victoria Bank & Trust
Co., 493 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974).
91. Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041, 1046 (5th Cir. 1973).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1047-48.
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bringing new management into the bank in order to assure themselves that they are not exposing themselves to the hazards of an
"equal pay" investigation and litigation.
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